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Abstract 
New Zealand has, by OECD standards, high birth rates.  This has provided New Zealand 
with a relatively young population and continuing labour force growth.  Both these features 
are, on many accounts, good for economic growth.  Yet most discussions of New 
Zealand’s economic performance and its prospects for moving up the OECD income 
distribution have paid little attention to demography.   
This paper defines “demography” narrowly as population size, growth, and age-structure, 
and examines the likely effects on New Zealand’s growth rate in GDP per capita, relative 
to the rest of the OECD.  The first part of the paper gives a broad overview of trends in 
population size and age structure in New Zealand and elsewhere in the OECD.  The 
second part describes selected demographic trends in more detail and discusses their 
economic significance.  The overall conclusion is future demographic trends are likely to 
provide New Zealand with a small advantage, relative to the rest of the OECD. 
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  J1 – Demographic economics 
KEYWORDS  New Zealand; OECD; demography; economic growth 
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Demographic Change and  
New Zealand’s Economic Growth  
1 Introduction 
New Zealand has slipped down many OECD league tables since the 1950s, but not the 
table for fertility rates.  In 2000, New Zealand’s fertility rates placed it fifth in the OECD, 
some way behind Turkey and Mexico, but only marginally behind the United States and 
Iceland.
1
  Higher fertility rates generally mean a younger population and continued labour 
force growth.  Many commentators argue that a younger population and growing labour 
force is good for economic growth.  New Zealand’s relatively high birth rates may 
therefore give New Zealand a slight economic advantage over other OECD countries.  
This needs to be taken into account when assessing New Zealand’s prospects for 
returning to the top half of the OECD.  It also needs to be taken into account when 
assessing the relevance of imported policy prescriptions about maintaining growth rates in 
the face of an  “old age crisis” (World Bank 1994; OECD 1998).  Yet demographic trends 
have received little attention in recent debate on the New Zealand economy. 
This paper surveys the likely effects of New Zealand’s slightly unusual demographic 
profile on its prospects for growth in GDP per capita.  “Demography” is defined narrowly to 
mean population size, growth, and age-structure.  Some topics that are occasionally 
included under the heading of demography, such as education levels or population 
“quality”, are deliberately excluded.  The paper also abstracts away from many country-
specific details.  For instance, when looking at the effects of population ageing on labour 
force participation, the paper ignores cross-country differences in age-specific 
participation rates. 
The decision to focus on the demographic basics was taken partly on pragmatic 
grounds—the paper needed to be restricted somehow—and partly in reaction to previous 
research.  With some important exceptions, such as the work summarized in Bloom 
(2001), the international literature on the economics of population has placed relatively 
little emphasis on detailed exploration of underlying demographic trends.  For instance, of 
the 30 background papers that the OECD commissioned for its 1998 report Maintaining 
Prosperity in an Ageing Society, none looked specifically at the demographic trends 
(OECD 1998: 138-9).  Some demographers have been conducting detailed analyses of 
demographic trends with likely economic significance (Pool 2000; McDonald and Kippen 
                                                                 
1 This is based on estimates of the “total fertility rate” obtained from the OECD Health Indicators online database.  The total fertility rate 
is the number of births the average woman would have over her lifetime if prevailing age-specific fertility rates were to be maintained 
indefinitely.  The OECD estimates are as follows: Mexico, 2.62; Turkey, 2.50; United States, 1.99; Iceland 1.98; New Zealand, 1.97.  
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2001), but this has had limited impact on economics.  The result is that the pool of stylised 
demographic facts drawn on by most economic analyses is very limited. 
The first part of this paper gives a broad overview of trends in population size and age 
structure in the OECD, and at the underlying trends in fertility, mortality, and migration.  It 
begins by looking at the OECD as a whole, and then moves on to comparisons between 
New Zealand and other countries and regions.  The second part of the paper combines 
demography and a little economics.  It describes selected demographic trends in more 
detail and discusses their potential economic significance, including their likely impact on 
New Zealand’s ability to raise its GDP per capita closer to that of wealthier OECD 
countries.  The emphasis of the paper is generally on relative, rather than absolute, GDP 
levels and growth rates.  The paper does not consider the relationship between changing 
demography and savings, a large topic that has received detailed treatment elsewhere 
(Hurd 1997; Weil 1997). 
The paper concludes that future trends in the proportional share of the working-age 
population and in the balance between young and old dependants will advantage New 
Zealand compared to Europe and Japan, but not compared to Australia and North 
America.  The advantage is likely to be relatively small: it would be unrealistic to expect 
narrowly defined determinants such as population size and structure to have a large 
influence on a phenomenon as complicated as economic growth.  But the predictability of 
demographic change means that incorporating demography into discussions of future 
economic prospects can nevertheless be valuable. 
2  Overview of demographic trends 
2.1  The sample and data 
The paper compares only across countries in the OECD.  Most policy discussion concerns 
New Zealand’s position in the OECD income distribution rather than the world income 
distribution.  The paper’s approach of holding institutions, income levels, culture, and 
other determinants of long-run economic performance constant is also more sensible 
when comparison is limited to the OECD than it would be for a larger, more 
heterogeneous group. 
The paper uses data for all 30 OECD countries.  Results are shown for New Zealand, 
Australia, Japan, and the three groups defined as follows: 
Group Countries  included 
Europe  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Recently developed 
countries (RDCs) 
Korea, Mexico, Turkey 
North America  Canada, United States 
Australia is treated separately because the Australian and New Zealand labour markets 
are closely integrated, and because Australia is the principal country with which New 
Zealand compares itself.  The three groups have been assembled on the basis of 
geography and economic similarity.  Japan forms its own group, as it does not fit into any 
of the others.  The groups would be slightly different if they had been assembled on the 
basis of demographic similarity. France, for instance, would be included with the United  
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States, and Canada would be included with the European countries, on the basis of 
current fertility rates (France, like the United States, has significantly higher fertility than 
Canada).  The contrasts between the demographic prospects of different groups would be 
more marked if current demographic conditions, rather than geography or current 
economic conditions, had been used to assign countries to groups. 
The paper uses “the OECD” as shorthand for “countries that are currently members of the 
OECD”.  This leads to a few anachronisms, such as references to the OECD population in 
1950, although the OECD was not established until 1961.  The justification is 
convenience. 
The demographic estimates and projections are obtained from the United Nations 
Population Division’s online database World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision.
2
  
The UN estimates and projections are the only ones available that are sufficiently detailed, 
consistent, and comprehensive to enable the cross-country comparisons carried out in 
this paper. 
2.2  Uncertainty about future demographic trends 
The UN projections are not well suited, however, to properly representing uncertainty 
about future demographic trends.  The UN represents uncertainty simply by calculating 
three different projection variants based on “high”, “median” and “low” fertility 
assumptions, with the median assumption being the UN’s preferred estimate.  As 
demographers now emphasise, the traditional variant approach can give misleading 
results.  The only internally consistent and readily interpretable way of representing 
uncertainty about future demographic trends is to construct fully stochastic population 
projections (Lutz, Vaupel, and Ahlburg 1998; Bryant 2003a). 
Since stochastic population projections with the required level of detail are not available, 
this paper cannot represent uncertainty in a satisfactory way.  The charts in this paper 
show only the UN’s median variant.  Warning are, however, attached to results that 
demographic principles suggest are particularly uncertain.  The paper also avoids 
spuriously precise statements of the form “Country X’s population will begin to decline in 
year 2037.” 
2.3  Trends in OECD averages 
This section averages across the entire OECD, to establish the major trends.  Cross-
country differences are examined in the following section. 
Movements in population size and age structure are driven by movements in fertility, 
mortality, and migration.  Figure 1 shows fertility and mortality rates.  Fertility is measured 
using the “total fertility rate”.  This is the sum of (single-year) age-specific fertility rates; it 
has an intuitive interpretation as the number of births the average woman would have over 
her life time if prevailing age-specific fertility rates were to prevail indefinitely.  Average 
fertility has clearly been falling since the 1960s.  Fertility rates during the 1950s and 
1960s, the height of the baby boom, were in fact higher than they had been for several 
decades, except in the recently developed countries (RDCs) and Japan.  Even in the 
RDCs, however, the post-war declines in infant and child mortality meant that “net” fertility 
                                                                 
2 http://esa.un.org/unpp/  
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was higher than previously.  The UN median variant projection shown in Figure 1 
assumes that average fertility will rise somewhat in coming decades. 
Mortality is measured in Figure 1 by life expectancy at birth.  As is apparent in the figure, 
the UN assumes that gains in life expectancy will be smaller in future decades than they 
have been in past decades.  There are as yet no signs of a slow-down, however, and 
demographers are increasingly arguing that the UN is underestimating future life 
expectancies (Vaupel 1997). 







Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects online database. 









Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects online database. 
Unfortunately, data on total migration into and out of the OECD as a whole are scarce.  
The UN’s Population Prospects online database does show, however, that net migration 
into “developed regions” in 2000 was about 1.8 migrants per thousand population.   




                                                                 
3 This can be illustrated using Statistics New Zealand’s projections for the New Zealand population in 2051.  Projection Series 3 and 6 
use identical fertility and migration assumptions, but in Series 3 net annual migration is 0, while in Series 6 it is 20,000.    Higher 
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Past and projected population sizes and growth rates for the whole of the OECD are 
shown in the bottom row of Table 1.  The OECD as a whole grew steadily over the period 
1950-2000, but the UN predicts that in-migration and future improvements in mortality will 
only partly compensate for lower birth rates, so that population growth will slow markedly 
in the future. 
Figure 2 shows trends in age structure.  Note that the working-age population is defined 
here, and throughout the paper, as ages 20-64, and not 15-64, 15+, or 20+ as is often 
done.  Most 15-19 year olds in OECD countries are now in education rather than work, so 
an increase in the size of this age group is more accurately represented as an increase in 
the “dependent” population than the “working age” population.  An analogous argument 
applies to people aged 65 and over. 
The age groups used here and in most other charts in this paper are very broad, to 
simplify comparisons.  This means, however, that only the most pronounced structural 
changes are visible. 
Table 1 – Estimates and projections of population size and growth rates 
 Historical    Projected 















Australia 8.2  19.1  1.7%    25.4  0.6% 
Europe 350.8  452.7  0.5%    379.1  -0.3% 
Japan 83.6  127.1  0.8%    98.7  -0.5% 
New  Zealand  1.9 3.8 1.4%    4.2  0.3% 
RDCs 68.9  212.3  2.3%    289.9  0.6% 
N America  171.6  314.0  1.2%    417.9  0.6% 
OECD Total  685.0  1128.9  1.0%    1215.2  0.2% 
Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
The proportional shares of the three age groups in Figure 2 show the imprint of the baby 
boom and subsequent baby bust.
4
  The proportional share of the 0-19 age group 
increased, mainly at the expense of age group 20-64, during the baby boom decades of 
the 1950s and 1960s.  From the 1970s, however, the proportional share of the age group 
20-64 increased again as the baby boom cohorts began to turn 20.  As long as the baby 
boom cohorts remain in the working ages, the proportional share of 20-64 age group will 
remain high.  From about 2020, however, when the baby boom cohorts start to reach age 
65, the proportional share of the 20-64 age group is projected to fall, and the share of the 
65+ age group is projected to rise.  The low fertility rates experienced since the 1980s 
have kept the proportional share of the 0-19 group small. 
The population waves induced by the baby boom and bust have been occurring 
simultaneously with a rise in the proportional share of older people, resulting from 
continuing life expectancy gains.  Given that the UN may have underestimated the 
potential for continued increases in life expectancy, the proportional share of the aged 
may well turn out to be higher than Figure 2 suggests. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(calculated from Statistics New Zealand, National Population Projections, 2001(base)-2051, Tables 2 and 3, available online at 
www.stats.govt.nz.) 
4 A typology and framework for analysing age-structural changes is set out in Pool (2000, 2001).  
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2.4 Geographical  differences 
As Figure 3 shows, the recently developed countries (RDCs) have experienced the 
highest fertility levels in the OECD.  New Zealand has, however, had the highest baby 
boom fertility rates of the non-RDCs shown, though in the decades since the baby boom 
New Zealand has had similar rates to North America, and only slightly higher rates than 
Australia.  The UN’s median projection implies substantial convergence over coming 
decades, except that New Zealand, Australia, the RDCs, and North America are assumed 
to maintain slightly higher fertility than Europe and Japan.   
Figure 3 – Estimates and median variant projections of total fertility rates, OECD 











Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
Figure 4 presents estimates and projections for life expectancy.  With the exception of 
Japan and the RDCs, the expectancies are tightly bunched.  One demographer even 
suggests that the group of the 21 biggest and most industrialized countries “is behaving 
increasingly as if it had a single mortality pattern” (White 2002: 74).  The UN assumes that 
life expectancy will continue to grow faster in Japan that in other wealthy countries.  Some 
demographers have, however, questioned this assumption (Wilmoth 1998; White 2002).  
The UN estimates that in recent years, New Zealand has had net inward migration levels 
of 1 to 2 per thousand.  The corresponding figures are 3 to 5 per thousand in Australia 
and North America, 1 to 2 per thousand in Europe, 0 to 1 per thousand in Japan, and –2 
to –1 per thousand in the RDCs.  The UN assumes that migration will continue at 
approximately these levels. 
Geographical differences in population sizes and growth rates are shown in Table 1.   
Fertility rates over the period 1950-2000 are clearly reflected in population growth rates.  
The RDCs have grown fastest, followed by Australia, New Zealand, and North America, 
followed by Japan and Europe.  Over the period 2000-2050, the populations of the RDCs, 
Australia, New Zealand, and North America are projected to continue growing, while the 
populations of Japan and Europe are projected to shrink.  New Zealand’s projected 
growth rate is smaller than that of Australia and North America because New Zealand is 
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Historical Projected 
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2050 for the ranking of countries and regions by total population to change: North America 
overtakes Europe, and the RDCs overtake Japan. 












Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
 
Geographical differences in trends in age structure are summarised Figure 5.  Panel (i) 
indicates that the countries with the highest fertility rates have the highest proportions in 
the youngest age group.  As Panel (iii) shows, the reverse is true for the oldest age group.  
Panel (ii) portrays a more complicated situation.  Roughly speaking, the countries with the 
highest fertility initially have the lowest proportion in the working ages, until around 2010, 
the order reverses and these countries have the highest proportion in the working ages.  
This reversal occurs because a decline in fertility initially raises but then lowers the 
population in the working ages. 
In all three panels of Figure 5, New Zealand’s trajectory is very similar to that of Australia 
and North America.  This immediately suggests that any effects that age structure per se 
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(iii) Population aged 65+ 
 
 
Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
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3  Effects on growth in GDP per capita 
3.1 The  framework 










≡  (1) 
where  Y  is GDP, P  is population, H  is hours worked, and W  is working-age 
population.  The decomposition implies that per capita GDP is a product of labour 
productivity, participation (incorporating both employment levels and hours worked), and 
the proportion of the population in the working ages.  If a demographic trend is to affect 
GDP per capita, it must do so by affecting one or more of these terms. 
For some purposes it is useful to look at the effect of demographic trends on growth rates 
rather than levels.  Taking logs of Equation 1 and differentiating with respect to time yields 








Y r r r r + + = . (2) 
The growth rate of GDP per capita is equal to the sum of the growth rates of labour 
productivity, participation, and the proportion in the working ages.  This equation can be 
used to decompose historical growth rates, or to project future growth rates. 
3.2  The proportion of the population in the working ages 
and GDP per capita 
Under the decomposition set out in Equation 1, the relationship between the proportion of 
the population in the working ages  P W and GDP per capita is purely mechanical.  If, for 
instance, the proportion in the working ages goes from 50% to 60%—an increase of 
20%—then GDP per capita increases by 20%.  An increase in the labour force might be 
expected to have additional indirect effects, but these must be appear as changes in the 
W H  and  H Y  terms, and not the  P W  term.  Proportions in the working ages are 
graphed in Panel (ii) of Figure 5; the values, plus the changes in these values, are 
summarised in Table 2.  
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Table 2 -– Estimates and projections for the proportion of the population in the 
working ages 
 
Proportion of population in the working ages    Percentage increase* in the proportion in 
the working ages 
  Historical   Projected    Historical  Projected 
 








Australia  58.6% 54.7% 60.1%  57.8% 54.0%  -6.5%  9.9%   -3.9% -6.6% 
Europe  58.2% 55.7% 60.9%  58.6% 51.2%  -4.3%  9.3%   -3.8%  -12.7% 
Japan  49.3% 60.6% 62.2%  54.3% 46.7%  23.0%  2.6%    -12.7%  -14.1% 
New  Zealand  55.0% 51.6% 58.3%  57.8% 53.9%  -6.1% 12.9%   -0.9% -6.7% 
RDCs  45.2% 42.3% 55.2%  60.5% 54.9%  -6.3% 30.5%    9.5% -9.2% 
North  America  57.4% 54.7% 59.3%  57.1% 54.3%  -4.7%  8.3%   -3.6% -5.0% 
OECD  total  55.6% 54.1% 59.5%  58.1% 52.8%  -2.8% 10.0%   -2.4% -9.2% 
*This is the percentage increase, not the percentage point increase.  For example, the result for Australia 1950-1975 is calculated as 
100%*(54.7%/58.6%-1) = -6.5%. 
Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
As discussed earlier, for all countries and regions shown aside from Japan, the proportion 
in the working ages fell during the post-war baby boom, grew again afterwards, and will 
fall once more over coming decades.  This is apparent in Table 2.  Japan’s unusual 
dynamics advantaged it in the past, relative to the other countries and regions shown, but 
have begun to seriously disadvantage it.  The swings in the RDCs are in the same 
direction as the majority of the OECD, but are more dramatic. 
In 1975, the proportion of the New Zealand population in the working ages was only 
51.6%, which was 2.5 percentage points below the OECD average, and lower than any 
country or region shown, other than the RDCs.  Since that time, however, the gap 
between New Zealand and the rest of the OECD has been closing; under current 
projections the gap will continue to close in the near future.  These population movements 
imply an increase in the growth rate of New Zealand’s per capita income, relative to the 
rest of the OECD.  This is one case where New Zealand’s demographic profile is 
delivering it a small advantage over Australia and North America, as well as Europe and 
Japan. 
3.3  Growth in the working-age population and growth in 
labour productivity 
The previous section discussed the working age population’s proportional share; this 
section discusses its absolute size.  Many economists argue that the size of the working 
age population can affect labour productivity, the  H Y  term in Equation 1. 
Changes in the size of the working age population are shown in Table 3.  In all countries 
and regions, growth slows over time.  The projected values for sizes and growth rates are 
quite sensitive to variations in assumptions about migration, and, over the long run, 
assumptions about fertility.  Given these uncertainties, the most sensible way to interpret 
the table is probably that New Zealand, Australia, the RDCs, and North America belong to 
one relatively fast-growing group, while Japan and Europe belong to another relatively 
slow-growing group.  
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Table 3 – Estimates and projections for the size of the population in the working 
ages 
 
Population in the working ages (millions)    Percentage increase in the population in 
the working ages 
  Historical   Projected    Historical  Projected 
 








Australia  4.8  7.6 11.5  13.6 14.3 58% 51%    18%  5% 
Europe  204.3 233.6 275.6  260.3 206.7  14%  18%  -6% -21% 
Japan  41.2 67.6 79.1  67.3 51.0 64% 17%    -15%  -24% 
New  Zealand  1.0 1.6 2.2  2.5 2.4  52%  38%    13%  -4% 
RDCs  31.1  56.9 117.2  162.6 163.1  83% 106%   39%  0% 
North  America  98.5 133.1 186.0  219.0 237.4  35%  40%   18%  8% 
OECD  total  381.0 500.4 671.7  725.2 674.9  31%  34%  8%  -7% 
Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
Many models of endogenous economic growth and of agglomeration effects posit a 
positive relationship between population size or growth and labour productivity.   
“Population” is used implicitly to mean “working age population”, so these models may 
shed some light on the economic implications of the trends in working age population 
apparent in Table 3. 
Some endogenous growth models assume that labour productivity is positively related to 
population size or growth simply because more people means more ideas (Romer 2001).  
These models are sometimes cited in discussions of population ageing and countries’ 
relative economic prospects.  But it is not clear that such models are in fact relevant.  After 
setting up one such model, for instance, Jones (1997: 21) warns that “as with many ideas-
based growth models, this is a model of growth for the world economy as a whole…The 
Belgian economy does not grow solely or even primarily because of ideas invented by 
Belgians, so the model does not predict that Belgium’s per capita growth rate should be 
related to its population growth rate.’ 
There are other, more plausible, mechanisms through which increased population size 
could raise a country’s productivity.  An increase in the pool of workers permits increased 
specialization, thicker markets, and greater potential for knowledge spillovers.  Such 
effects may be particularly salient for small, distant economies such as New Zealand 
{Treasury, 2002 #3231}. 
However, not all the proposed effects of growth in the working age population are 
necessarily favourable.  Economists have long argued that if labour becomes relatively 
abundant, its price falls, and employers have less incentive to provide workers with capital 
or new labour-saving technologies.  If labour becomes relatively scarce, the converse is 
true.  A notable formal model of this process has been developed by Romer (1990).  In 
this model, a rise in the supply of labour draws human capital from away from the 
production of research into the production of final goods, which lowers the rate of 
technical change and hence of economic growth. 
There is a large literature investigating the empirical applicability of these models.
5
  The 
remainder of this section looks briefly at some of the macro-level studies of the 
                                                                 
5 See, for instance, the studies reviewed by Disney (1996) and Hansen (2002).  
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relationship between growth in the working age population and growth in per capita 
productivity or incomes.   
Several studies focussing directly on the relationship between growth in productivity and 
growth in the working age population have found the relationship to be negative.  Romer 
(1990: 354-7) graphs movements in the working-age population and output per hour 
worked in the United States over the period 1839-1979 to show that, over periods of 20-40 
years, increases in the growth rate of the working-age population seem to induce a one-
to-one reduction in the growth rate of labour productivity.  He also points out that the 
incomes of US applied scientists and engineers declined relative to the incomes of 
doctors, lawyers, and managers during the period of rapid growth in the working-age 
population in the 1970s and 1980s, just as his model would predict.  Little and Triest 
(2002: 145-9) carry out a simple regression analysis on US data for the period 1904-1999, 
and find a similar effect from growth in the population in the working ages to growth in 
labour productivity and multifactor productivity.  Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers 
(1990: 38-45) carry out a regression with fixed country effects on data for 29 high-income 
countries in the period 1960-85.  The relationship between growth in the working-age 
population and growth in labour productivity varies across specifications, but under all 
except one specification an increase in the growth rate of the working-age population of 
1% is associated with a decrease in the growth rate of labour productivity of between 0% 
and 1%. 
Findings such as these imply that the relationship between growth in labour productivity 
and growth in the working age population can be approximated by an equation of the form 
0 ,, YW
H
ra b r a b =− > (3) 
where a and b are constants, and b measures the extent to which growth in the working 
age population depresses growth in labour productivity.  Substituting Equation 3 and the 
identity  P W
P





Y r r b r a r − − + + = ) (1 . (4) 
This equation implies that if the productivity-depressing effects of growth in the working 
age are large, then regressions of growth in per capita GDP on growth in the working age 
and total population should obtain coefficients for the working age population that are 
close to zero or negative. 
This is not what happens.  In their influential study of demography and economic growth in 
East Asia between 1965 and 1990, Bloom and Williamson (1998) regress growth rates for 
GDP per capita on growth rates for the working age and total population, and on other 
possible determinants of economic growth.  Under a range of specifications, the 
coefficient on growth in the working age population is slightly higher than 1.   This 
suggests that growth in the working age population did nothing to depress productivity 
growth.  The relevance to the OECD of results from developing countries could perhaps 
be questioned.  Brander and Dowrick (1994), however, carry out a similar analysis on data 
for 67 middle and high income countries over the period 1960-1985.  In their preferred 
specification, the coefficient on growth in the working age population is also slightly higher 
than 1 (Brander and Dowrick 1994: Table 7).    
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It seems, then, that neither the empirical nor the theoretical literature provide clear 
guidance on how growth in the working age population affect growth in labour productivity.  
The significance for New Zealand’s labour productivity of the trends shown in Table 3 is 
therefore uncertain. 
3.4  Fertility rates and female labour force participation 
New Zealand and the other countries with relatively young age structures owe these age 
structures to relatively high fertility rates.  High fertility rates might be expected to depress 
the participation term  W H  in Equation 1, on the grounds that parenthood keeps people 
out of the workforce.  Given the prevailing division of labour between genders, the effect 
on participation would presumably be most apparent for women. 
Figure 6 presents 2001 OECD data on fertility rates and female labour force participation 
to test these ideas.  The two countries with the highest fertility do indeed have the lowest 
participation rates.  But these two counties, Turkey and Mexico, are clear outliers.  Among 
the remaining countries, there is in fact a mildly positive association between fertility and 
labour force participation.  This was not always the case: in the 1970s the association was 
negative (Ahn and Mira 2002).  Scholars generally explain the current positive association 
by pointing to institutional features, such as the availability of childcare, that reduce the 
incompatibility of childrearing and paid work, and raise both fertility and participation 
(Rindfuss and Brewster 1996).  The reason that Mexico and Turkey fail to conform to 
these generalizations is probably that they are significantly poorer than any other OECD 
countries, and have rather different economic and social structures. 
The international literature on fertility rates and labour force participation is vast and 
inconclusive. Given that there is no clear relationship between fertility rates and 
participation, and that fertility rates have in any case been converging across the OECD 
(Figure 3), it seems unlikely that differences due to fertility in participation rates will be an 
important source of cross-country variation in per capita incomes. 










Source - OECD Health and Labour Force Indicators online databases 
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3.5  The age structure of the working age population 
Within the working age population, both employment and productivity vary by age.  All 
else equal, a change in the age structure of the working age population implies a change 
in average participation and productivity levels, the  W H  and  H Y  terms in Equation 1.  
Some commentators imply that these charges will be significant (OECD 1998). 
The relationship between the age structure of the working age population and average 
participation levels across the working-age population can be expressed with an equation 












 =∑ ,        1 = ∑
i
i a , (5) 
where  () i W H  is average hours worked by people in age group i , and  i a  is the 
proportion of the working age population in age group i .  A similar equation can be used 
for productivity, though in this case the  i a ’s measure hours worked by people in age 
group i  as a proportion of hours worked by the whole working age population. 
Figure 7 shows the proportion of age groups 20-24 to 60-64 in employment, an 
approximation of the () i W H ’s.  Estimates are shown for New Zealand and for the OECD 
as a whole.  Obtaining analogous estimates for productivity is more difficult, since all of 
the usual measures such as wages or time in employment are flawed in important ways.  
The standard assumption, however, is that the productivity rises and then declines with 
age (Stephenson and Scobie 2002: 9-10). 









Source: Calculated from data from the OECD Labour force data online database 
Note: Employment ratios are defined here as the number employed full time or part time divided by the population in the age group.  All 
results are for males and females combined. 
Are ongoing age structural changes sufficiently large to produce a significant effect on 
participation or productivity? Table 4 presents data on the age-structural changes.  The 
projected age structures for 2050 are noticeably different from those of 1950: for instance, 
the proportion of the New Zealand working age population aged 60-64 increases from 
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the mean age of the New Zealand working age population rises by only 3.3 years over the 
century between 1950 and 2050.   
Table 4 – Distribution of working age population by age 
 New  Zealand  OECD 
  1950 2000 2050 1950 2000 2050 
 20-24  13.3%  11.2%  10.7%    14.6% 12.1% 10.7% 
 25-29  13.6%  11.8%  10.1%    14.0% 12.6% 10.8% 
 30-34  13.0%  12.7%  9.8%    11.4% 12.7% 10.9% 
 35-39  13.1%  14.0%  10.4%    12.5% 12.9% 10.8% 
 40-44  12.1%  13.1%  11.1%    12.1% 12.2% 10.9% 
 45-49  10.4%  11.6%  11.6%    10.7% 11.2% 11.1% 
 50-54  9.1%  10.7%  12.1%    9.6% 10.4% 11.6% 
 55-59  7.9%  8.3%  12.6%    8.1% 8.5%  11.9% 
 60-64  7.5%*  6.7%  11.6%    7.0% 7.5%  11.4% 
Total 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%    100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Mean age (years)  40.0  40.7  43.3    39.8 40.7 42.9 
Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
*The high figure for 1950 is not a typological error.  It probably reflects the effects of the fertility decline from the late 19th Century to the 
early 20th Century, which mean that older cohorts in 1950 were unsually large, compared with younger cohorts. 
As Figure 8 shows, changes in the mean age of the working age population are relatively 
small across the OECD, and much smaller than changes in the mean age of the entire 
population.  Similarly, cross-country differences in the mean age are far smaller for the 
working age population than for the total population.  The reason is that most variation 
across time and between countries in the overall age structure of the population is due to 
variation at the youngest and oldest ages. 
The expression for the mean age of the working age population is  ii
i
am ∑  where  i m  is 
the mean age of people in age group i .
6
   This has exactly the same form as Equation 5, 
the equation for average participation, with the  i m ’s replacing the  W H ’s.  The fact that 
the age structural changes do not have much effect on the mean age therefore suggests 
that they would not have much effect on the participation rate either.  This is indeed the 
case.  If, for instance, the OECD age specific employment ratios shown in Figure 7 are 
applied to the age structure of the New Zealand population in 1950, the overall ratio is 
69.2%.  If the same age specific ratios are applied to the age structure in 2050, the overall 
ratio is 67.2%.  The peak occurs in 2000, when the overall ratio reaches 69.9%.  The 
changes are small.  Performing the same calculations for other countries yields similar 
results.  In the absence of good estimates of age-specific productivity rates, no such 
calculations are possible for productivity.  But because the relationship between overall 
rates, age-specific rates, and age structure is essentially the same, there is no reason to 
believe that the effect of changing age structures on productivity would be any more 
striking. 
 
                                                                 
6 The calculations in Table 4 and Figure 8 use the values 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, and so on.  Strictly speaking, using the midpoints assumes 
that the population is distributed evenly within each age group.  This assumption is not met in practice, but this does not materially 
affect the results.    
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Figure 8 – Estimates and projection of the mean age of the working age and total 
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Source: Calculated from data from the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects  online database. 
The overall conclusion is that the effects of changes in the age structure of the working 
age population on participation and productivity are likely to be small.  There is therefore 
little scope for trends in the age of the working age population to advantage or 
disadvantage New Zealand relative to other OECD countries.   
3.6  Young dependants and old dependants 
The complements of measures of the population in the working ages are measures of the 
dependent population.  The most frequently-cited such measure is the “dependency ratio”, 
generally defined as the ratio of the population outside the working ages to the population 
inside the working ages.  A fall in the proportion inside the working ages implies a rise in 
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working ages is projected to begin falling in New Zealand, and in all the other selected 
countries and regions, some time within the next 20 or 30 years.  However, the projected 
declines are not large, and would only return most countries and regions to the levels of 
the 1970s. 
As Panels (i) and (iii) of Figure 5 show, the reason the dependency ratio is relatively 
stable is that increases in old-age dependency are offset by decreases in youth 
dependency.  This implies that the balance between young dependants and old 
dependants is shifting towards old dependants.  Figure 9, showing old dependants as a 
percentage of total dependants, bears this out.  In contrast to the changes in the share of 
dependants in the total population, the changes in the share of old dependants in total 
dependants are large.  In 1950, young dependants predominated throughout the OECD, 
but by 2050 old dependants are projected to make up 60%-70% of all dependants in 
Europe and Japan and around 50% elsewhere, including New Zealand.  If, as many 
demographers believe, the UN has underestimated the scope for future mortality declines, 
the share of old dependants will be even higher than Figure 9 suggests. 
Under current patterns of expenditure, the shift to old-age dependency is probably 
increasing the amount of resources transferred to dependants by the state.  Across the 
OECD, government social expenditures per old person are much larger than expenditures 
per young person (Weil 1997: Table 10).  Illustrative data for New Zealand are shown in 
Figure 10.  Expenditures increase sharply between ages 60-64 and 65-69 as people 
become eligible for New Zealand Superannuation, and climb steadily after that, reflecting 
health care costs.  As the share of the population in these high cost age groups increases, 
overall social expenditures can be expected to rise. 
Figure 9 – Estimates and projections for the population aged 65+ as a percentage of 
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Sources - All data apart from health expenditure data were obtained from Creedy and Scobie (2002: Appendix Tables 4,5).  Health 
expenditure data were obtained from the New Zealand Treasury’s Long-Term Fiscal Model 
(www.treasury.govt.nz/ltfm/default.asp).  Combined male and female totals were obtained by weighting by population 
numbers from the 2001 Census, available at from the Statistics New Zealand website www.stats.govt.nz.   
 
A recent paper by Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) challenges this conclusion.  Razin et 
al  construct a political-economic model in which, under certain parameter settings, an 
increase in the old-age dependency leads a majority of voters to support a decrease in 
social expenditures per capita.  Razin et al  carry out a panel regression using data for 13 
OECD countries, and obtain results suggesting that rising dependency is indeed 
associated with falling social expenditures per capita.  Razin et al’s regression does not, 
however, distinguish between changes in overall dependency due to rises in old age 
dependency and changes due to falls in youth dependency.  When Razin et al’s 
regressions are adjusted to allow for this distinction, rising old age dependency is found to 
be associated with rising, not falling, social expenditure per capita (Bryant 2003b).  The 
standard assumption that increases in old-age dependency imply increases in fiscal 
pressures appears to be vindicated. 
Governments of countries where a shift towards old-age dependency is creating pressure 
for increased social expenditures face unpalatable choices: holding expenditure down 
regardless, cutting other areas of government expenditure, raising taxes, building up debt, 
or doing some combination of the above.  There is, of course, extensive debate among 
economists about the extent to which these various measures reduce welfare or reduce 
participation and productivity.  For instance, some critics of the World Bank (1994) report 
Averting the Old Age Crisis argue that the Bank exaggerates the harm done by higher tax 
rates (Beattie and McGillivray 1995).  The Bank has, however, stood its ground (James 
1996).  Indeed, it is hard to believe that increased taxes would not have some effect on 
participation or investment decisions, and that increased public expenditure on pensions 
and health care would not partly crowd out productivity-enhancing public expenditure on 
infrastructure, schools, and research.  To the extent that fiscal pressures do threaten 
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Zealand, Australia, the RDCs, and North America are likely to give them a slight economic 
advantage over  Europe and Japan. 
4 Conclusion 
UN estimates and projections for the OECD over the period 1950-2050 show population 
growth slowing, the proportion of the population in the younger age groups declining, the 
proportion in the older age groups rising, and intermediate age groups left relatively 
unchanged.  For most purposes, the countries and regions considered in this paper fall 
into two groups, with New Zealand, Australia, the recently developed countries, and North 
America in one “high fertility” group, and Europe and Japan in a “low fertility” group.  The 
slowing of population growth, reduction in the share of the young, and increase in the 
share of the old are more marked in the low fertility group than in the high fertility group. 
Summaries of the paper’s conclusions about specific demographic trends and the effect of 
these trends on New Zealand’s GDP per capita, relative to the rest of the OECD, are 
given in Table 5.  As the table shows, neither New Zealand’s comparatively high fertility, 
nor its relatively young working age population, are likely to have much influence on New 
Zealand’s relative economic performance.  The fact that the proportion of the population in 
the working ages will decline less quickly in New Zealand than elsewhere in the OECD 
(other than the recently developed countries of Korea, Mexico, and Turkey) will be to New 
Zealand’s relative advantage, though the effect is unlikely to be large.  There is much 
greater uncertainty about the effects of growth in the absolute size of the working age 
population, and the effect of differences in the balance between old and young 
dependants.  The former may either help or hinder the high fertility countries such as New 
Zealand, while the latter will almost certainly be of some help, though how much is 
unclear.  The combined effect of the demographic trends is likely to be positive, though 
the magnitude is uncertain. 
Table 5 – Summary of specific demographic trends and their effect on the growth in 
GDP per capita in New Zealand relative to other OECD countries and 
regions 
Demographic trend  Effect on relative GDP per capita 
Proportion of population in the working ages projected to 
decline less in NZ than elsewhere in the OECD, except for 
the RDCs. 
Slight advantage over rest of OECD, other than RDCs, via 
“population” term W/P.  Magnitude of effect moderate but 
predictable. 
Working age population projected to continue increasing 
over next 20-30 years in New Zealand, Australia, North 
America, and RDCs, and to decline in Japan and Europe. 
Potentially conflicting influences on productivity (Y/H).  
Positive influences through agglomeration effects, and 
negative influences through reduced returns to investment 
in capital and labour-saving technologies.  Net effect 
extremely uncertain. 
Fertility levels higher in New Zealand, Australia, North 
America and RDCs than in Europe and Japan. 
Little evidence for common assumption that higher fertility 
implies lower participation (H/W).  Effect likely to be small. 
Working age population younger in New Zealand, 
Australia, North America and RDCs than in Europe and 
Japan. 
Changes in the age structure of the working age 
population smaller than generally thought, and have only a 
minor influence on average participation (H/W) and 
productivity (Y/H).  Effect small and predictable. 
Old-age dependency low and youth dependency high in 
New Zealand, Australia, North America and RDCs, 
compared to Europe and Japan. 
Fewer fiscal pressures, and hence less likelihood of tax 
rises or expenditures cuts threatening participation (H/W) 
and productivity (Y/H).  Effect positive, but highly 
uncertain.  
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Assessing the importance of demographic change to growth in GDP per capita currently 
involves a large element of subjective judgement.  It is reasonable, however, to hope that 
future progress in the economics of population will reduce some of the uncertainties.  Of 
the potential areas for future research indicated in Table 5, the effects of growth in the 
working age population perhaps deserves the greatest attention.  The size of the working 
age population is one variable over which governments can exert substantial control, 
through migration policy.  But at present, the research literature gives no clear answers on 
whether the net effect on GDP per capita of continued labour force growth is positive or 
negative. 
Despite all the uncertainties, however, there is an important sense in which judgements 
about the importance of demographic change can be less tentative than judgements 
about other influences on future economic performance.  Demographic trends are one of 
the few social trends for which predictions 20 or 30 years into the future are not just 
speculative.  It is reasonable to expect that demographic trends will help New Zealand 
gain some economic ground on Europe and Japan, though perhaps not Australia and 
North America.  This serves as a reminder that, for all the disadvantages it is believed to 
face, New Zealand’s economy also enjoys a few advantages. 
Recognition of New Zealand’s relatively favourable demographic conditions is important 
when assessing the relevance of imported advice for dealing with the “old age crisis”, 
particularly if this advice originates from Europe or Japan.  The differences between New 
Zealand’s demographic conditions and those of Europe and Japan are differences of 
degree rather than kind.  But population issues that deserve urgent attention in Europe 
and Japan do not necessarily deserve the same attention here.  Setting appropriate 
priorities depends, among other things, on a proper understanding of ongoing 
demographic change.  
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